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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUmE LI MAY, 1948 NUmBER 2
ADMINISTRATIVE FINALITY
IN CLAIMS FOR OVERCHARGES
THOMAS P. HARDMAN*
For many years it has been well settled at common law that when
a public utility exacts an unreasonable rate the aggrieved patron may
invoke the ordinary machinery of judge and jury to recover the over-
charge.' Under modem legislation, however, or, as some think, under
cover thereof, the trend toward administrative finality has made such
vast inroads on the traditional theory of the supremacy of law that now-
adays in most jurisdictions the question of the retroactive unreasonable-
ness of charges made by public utilities has largely slipped from the con-
trol of the courts and, in certain far-reaching respects, from all judicial
control. In what may be classed as reparation cases there is, to a re-
markable degree, an inflexible adherence to the published rate without
regard to the merits of the particular controversy; the tariff filed with
the appropriate commission and administratively approved or put into
effect is the yardstick of legality.
2
* Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
1 The following authorities are illustrative: Churchman v. Tunstal, Hardres
162, 163 (1659); Parker v. Great Western Ry., 7 Man. & G. 253 (1844) ; Lafay-
ette & Indianapolis R. R. v. Pattison, 41 Ind. 312 (1872); Mobile & M. Ry. v.
Steiner, McGehee & Co., 61 Ala. 559 (1878); Heiserman v. Burlington, C. R.
& N. Ry., 43 Iowa 732 (1884) ; Peters, Ricker & Co. v. Railroad Co., 42 Ohio St.
275 (1884); W. Va. Transportation Co. v. Sweetzer, 25 W. Va. 434 (1885);
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 397 (1894); Clegg v.
Southern Ry., 135 N. C. 148, 47 S. E. 667 (1904); Ft. Smith & W. R. R. v.
Chandler Cotton Oil Co., 25 Okla. 82, 106 Pac. 10 (1909); 2 HUTCHINSON,
CAraERS (3d ed. 1906) §805; 2 WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS
(1911) §1072; cf. Allnutt v. Inglis, 12 East 527, 540, 542 (1810). The charges of
innkeepers have not been much disputed in court. See BEALE, INNxEEPERS AND
HOTELS (1906) §241. As to whether an excessive rate has been exacted or vol-
untarily paid, cf. Killmer v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 100 N. Y. 395, 3 N. E.
293 (1885).
2 A "reparation case," in the sense in which the term is used in this article, is
confined to that class of controversies in which it is sought to upset a filed rate
retroactively and recover the difference between that rate and a reasonable rate.
Claims for charges in excess of the filed tariffs are beyond the scope of this dis-
cussion.
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In an era when mechanical jurisprudence is moribund, if not
dead, in most branches of the law, and especially in the domain of public
law where economic and social facts are rarely constant, it has come as
something of a shock to many to learn that this inelastic method of de-
ciding cases is in vogue today in such an ever-important field as public
utilities. That this generally outmoded technique has made headway in
reparation cases over the judicial protest of such noted liberals as
Holmes and Brandeis' has served to emphasize this apparent anachron-
ism in the law-an anachronism and yet a neolegal development radi-
cally at variance with our traditional common-law thinking.
This protest has not, however, gone wholly unheeded. Indeed, there
are some significant indications, observable here and there, of dissatis-
faction with rigid rate structures. This is particularly noteworthy in the
federal system where the advocates of flexible tariffs have had great
opportunities to present their views. Rates, they contend, should be "ex-
perimentally laid down and experimentally tried out."4
In their principal opportunity before the United States Supreme
Court, however, the proponents of this theory suffered a major setback.
In that instance, Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry.,5 it appeared that the Interstate Commerce Commission had, upon
complaint and after hearing, prescribed a maximum rate which, as the
Commission subsequently found, was unreasonable. The Interstate
Commerce Act provides that rates shall be reasonable" and empowers
the Commission to award damages for injuries caused by violation of
the Act.7 A charge, filed pursuant to the original administrative order,
3 See dissent of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U. S. 370, 390 (1932). See also Hutcheson, J., in Eagle
Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443, 445-447 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
4 This epitome of what may be called the liberal view is made by Cardozo, J.,
in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 363 (1932).
See dissent of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U. S.
370, 390 (1932); concurring opinion of Hutcheson, J., in Eagle Cotton Oil Co.
v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443,445-447 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); ef. 2 SHARFMAN,
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 367 et seq.; Sharfman, The
Interstate Commerce Commission: An Appraisal (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 915. Cf.,
under state systems, Bonfils v. Public Utilities Comm., 67 Colo. 563, 189 Pac.
775 (1920); State ex tel. Boynton v. Public Service Comm., 135 Kan. 491, 11 P.
(2d) 999 (1932).
G284 U. S. 370 (1932).
641 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §1(5) (1929).
7 The section of the Interstate Commerce Act authorizing the Commission to
make reparation awards declares that "if, after hearing on a complaint made as
provided in section thirteen of this Act, the Commission shall determine that any
party complainant is entitled to an award of damages under the provisions of this
Act for a violation thereof, the Commission shall make an order directing the
carrier to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled on or before a
day named." 34 STAT. 590 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. §16(l) (1929).
2
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was collected by the utility. The short question before the Court was
whether the Commission could award reparation to a patron who had
paid the excessive rate. The Court held, Holmes and Brandeis, JJ.,
dissenting, that there could be no retroactive redress.
Roberts, J., speaking for the majority of the Court, makes the de-
cision turn on the distinction under the federal system-a court-drawn
distinction-between commission-approved rates and utility-made
rates. As to the latter, if unreasonable, reparation may be awarded.8
As to the former, however, there is no retroactive remedy, says-the
learned Justice, for the reason that the action of the Commission in
prescribing or approving such rates is legislative in character and
therefore "is subject to the same tests as to its validity as would be an
act of Congress intended to accomplish the same purpose."9 Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis, relying upon an opinion by Judge
Hutcheson in Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., ° take the position
that, under the federal system as distinguished from the state system,
nothing turns on whether the rate is utility-made or commission-
approved; that in either situation reparation may be awarded if the rate
is in fact unreasonable.
Although a so-called state rule, having the same core as the doc-
trine enunciated in the Arizona Grocery case, and, apart from proced-
ural problems, differing from it only in scope, existed at the time the
Arizona Grocery case was decided," both the majority opinion and the
dissent seem to assume that the rule under the usual state system is some-
thing quite alien to the applicable federal doctrine.' 2 In fact the major-
s The power of the commission to award reparation with respect to utility-
made rates is unquestioned. Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d)
443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931), cert. denied 284 U. S. 675 (1931); Arizona Grocery
Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U. S. 370 (1932); Atlantic & Y. Ry. v.
Carolina Button Corp., 74 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). If, however, the
Commission refuses to award reparation, the administrative action is not review-
able. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235 (1931). The Court based
this conclusion on the ground that "negative" orders of the Commission are not
subject to judicial review. But in a comparatively recent case Frankfurter, J.,
speaking for the Court, disapproved the distinction in this regard between "nega-
tive" and "affirmative" orders and explained the Standard Oil Co. case by saying
that the main basis of the decision was not the "negative order" doctrine but the
statutory scheme dealing with reparations. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United
States, 307 U. S. 125, 140 n. 23 (1939) ; cf. George Allison & Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm., 107 F. (2d) 180 (App. D. C. 1939).
) Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U. S. 370, 388.
10 51 F. (2d) 443, 445 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
"1 See authorities cited in note 19, infra.
12 The whole theory of Judge Hutcheson's opinion in the Eagle Cotton Oil Co.
case, on which the dissent relies, is that the state systems are radically different
from the federal system.
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ity opinion does not even mention the state rule, except perhaps by in-
direction. Quaere, however, whether the federal doctrine, whatever its
scope may be, is not, as a matter of substantive law, fundamentally the
same as the general state rule, having the same rationale but a more
limited orbit. If so, it would seem that, except in those jurisdictions in
which the rule does not obtain, the whole problem may be generalized
into a single inquiry, namely, the scope of the doctrine of the finality of
the "commission-approved" rate in claims for reparation.
The basic sameness of the two rules is well illustrated by one of the
earliest cases in point, T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R., decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1921.'3 In that case
an action was brought to recover an alleged overcharge. The challenged
rate had been filed with the appropriate commission. To what extent
and in what manner the commission had approved it does not clearly
appear. The court held that the rate, whether reasonable or not, could
not be retroactively upset in a reparation case. Said the court:
"The evidence shows without dispute that the tariff in ques-
tion was filed with the Railroad Commission and approved by that
body, and that it was published by the carrier, and became effec-
tive in practical and exclusive operation for about a year. It is true
that the evidence does not directly disclose the making of any pre-
cise and formal order of approval. But it must be presumed, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the Commission made
such an order in the premises as the law and their own orderly
practice required them to make...
"Manifestly there can be but one lawful rate in force at any
given time, and that rate by the very terms of the statutes quoted,14
is the rate which has been filed with and approved by the Com-
mission, and published by the carrier. Behind that rate, so long as
it remains unchanged, and so far as its application to specific ship-
ments is concerned, neither shipper nor carrier can go, and courts
cannot inquire...
"It seems to us that this proposition is self-evident and fun-
damental, and that it is the foundation of our regulatory system,
without which it would fail in its primary purposes, which are to
stabilize rates and charges, and to insure equality to shippers in
their application."'5
13 207 Ala. 253, 92 So. 797 (1921).
14 The statutory provision quoted by the court reads as follows: "No railroad
or common carrier shall charge, demand, collect, or receive a greater or less com-
pensation for the transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in
connection therewith, than is specified in such printed schedules and schedules of
joint rates, as may at the time be in force, except as provided by law, or the rail-
road commission, and the rates, fares, and charges named therein shall be the
lawful rates when approved by the railroad commission."
.5 207 Ala. at 256, 92 So. at 800 (1921).
4
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In a later case, Western Ry. of Alabama v. Montgomery County,1 6
decided after the Arizona Grocery case and under a statute differing
somewhat from the one under which the first case was decided, 7 the
Alabama court held that reparation could be awarded with respect to a
rate which had not been specifically approved by the commission, there-
by apparently conforming its doctrine to the federal rule and exempli-
fying the fundamental sameness of the two rules.' 8 The doctrine orig-
inally enunciated by the Alabama court is the usual state rule' 9 and one
of the best expressions of it to be found in the books.
From that formulation of the general rule, and from numerous de-
cisions in point,29 it would seem that the perfunctory administrative
16 228 Ala. 426, 153 So. 622 (1934).
17 4 ALA. CODE (1923) §§9722, 9723, 9703; cf. 2 ALA. CODE (1907) §§5553,
5554, 5525, 5527, 5669, 5678. The difference between these statutes is discussed
infra.
Is In the second Alabama decision the court distinguishes the Arizona Grocery
case by way of justification for limiting its own rule so as to make it seemingly
identical with the federal rule. The court relies largely on Eagle Cotton Oil Co.
v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931), in which the court held
under the federal rule that the rate in question was utility-made and therefore
not reparation-proof.
10 T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 207 Ala. 253, 92 So. 797
(1921); El Paso & S. W. R. R. v. Arizona Corp. Comm., 51 F. (2d) 273 (D. C.
Ariz. 1931) (Arizona statute); Reinschmidt v. Louisville & N. R. R., 118 Fla.
237, 160 So. 69 (1935); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. People, 77 Ill. 443 (1875)
semble; Great Western Portland Cement Co. v. Public Service Comm., 121 Kan.
531, 247 Pac. 881 (1926); Texas & P. Ry. v. Railroad Comm. of Louisiana, 137
La. 1059, 69 So. 837 (1915); Gurney Heater Mfg. Co. v. New York, N. H. & H.
R. R., 264 Mass. 427, 162 N. E. 897 (1928) ; Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Michigan
Public Service Comm., 315 Mich. 533, 24 N. W. (2d) 200 (1946); Crookston
Milling Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 185 Minn. 563, 242 N. W. 287 (1932) ; E. L.
Young Heading Co. v. Payne, 127 Miss. 48, 89 So. 782 (1921); State ex rel.
Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Public Service Comm., 303 Mo. 212, 259 S. W. 445
(1924); Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 91 Mont. 194,
7 P. (2d) 919 (1932); Farmers Union Livestock Comm. v. Union Pacific R. R.,
135 Neb. 689, 283 N. W. 498 (1939) (no reparation as to commission-made
rate); Kemp Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 36 N. M. 126, 9 P. (2d)
387 (1932); Murphy v. New York Central R. R., 225 N. Y. 548, 122 N. E. 700
(1919); Woodrich v. Northern Pacific Ry., 71 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934)
(North Dakota statute); Taylor-Williams Coal Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. of
Ohio, 97 Ohio St. 224, 119 N. E. 459 (1918) semble; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
v. State, 155 Okla. 236, 8 P. (2d) 744 (1932) (no reparation as to commission-
made rate-a variation of the usual rule); Chaltenham & Abington Sewerage
Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm., 344 Pa. 366, 25 A. (2d) 334 (1942)
(no reparation as to commission-made rate-a variation of the usual rule); Pro-
ducers' Refining Co. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 13 S. W. (2d) 680
(Tex. Com. App. 1929); Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry. v. Public Utilities Comm., 64
Utah 54, 227 Pac. 1025 (1924) ; Mathieson Alkali Works v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
147 Va. 426, 137 S. E. 608 (1927) ; State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Department
of Public Works, 185 Wash. 235, 53 P. (2d) 318 (1936) (no reparation until
date of challenge-a variation of the usual rule) ; Natural Gas Co. of W. Va. v.
Sommerville, 113 W. Va. 100, 166 S. E. 852 (1932) semble. In some instances
the rigid rule enunciated in these cases has been changed by legislative enactments.
As to statutory changes subsequent to these decisions, see note 90, infra.
20 See cases cited supra note 19.
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approval inherent in putting a tariff into effect is sufficient to make a
rate commission-approved within the meaning of the rule. Some state
courts scarcely discuss the question whether a challenged rate which has
been duly filed and put into effect has been administratively sanctioned.
In a much-cited case dealing with the need or quality of administrative
approval necessary to make a rate reparation-proof under the usual
state rule, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals said:
"It is true, as contended by plaintiff, that there is nothing in
the statute passed by the legislature which imposes upon the Corn-
mission the duty to affirmatively determine the reasonableness of
all rates proposed or petitioned for by transportation companies,
but the Constitution and statutes contemplate that all rates shall
be presented to and changes in rates shall be approved by the Com-
mission, and all these upon notice, publication, etc., a procedure
which gives finality of character to the action of the Commission
upon rates, ... We are not concerned with the methods pursued or
the Toles adopted and followed by the Commission in such mat-
ters."
21
In the Arizona Grocery case, on the other hand, a filed rate is not
treated as reparation-proof unless the Commission has in some formal
way, not yet definitely settled, determined that the rate is reasonable. But
both under the federal system and under the usual state system, once a
tariff has been administratively approved, either in fact or in theory, it
cannot be retroactively invalidated in a claim for overcharges. Thus, not
only under the federal rule but also under the so-called state rule, the
adjudication of a claim for reparation would seem to resolve itself into
a determination of the question whether the administrative sanction of
a challenged Tate is such as to make it "commission-approved" (a)
within the federal form of the rule if the problem arises under the Inter-
state Commerce Act, 22 or (b) within the meaning of the so-called state
rule if the question arises under a state statute of the usual type. Cases
decided under a state statute which differs materially from the general
type must be considered separately, although the substantive-law doc-
trines laid down in these cases are, in general, mere variations of the
usual state rule, differing from the federal version only in scope and,
in the most important type of variation, perhaps not even in that regard.
21 Mathieson Alkali Works v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 147 Va. 426, 442-443, 137
S. E. 608, 612 (1927). The last statement in the quotation from the court's
opinion was made with respect to "the physical impossibility of investigation and
... approval by the Commission of every proposed rate advance, and of the
practice followed by the Commission with. reference to proposed advances." In
the court's opinion this statement precedes the first part of the quotation.
22 The Federal Power Commission has no authority to award reparations. Fed-
eral Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 618 (1944).
6
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Where, as in some states, there is no statutory provision authoriz-
ing a reparation proceeding, the problem is simple. Under such a state
system the only possible method of retroactive redress would be the
common-law action to recover an overcharge. However, this remedy is
generally held to be inconsistent with the wide administrative control
granted to the commissions with respect to filed rates.2 3 The usual atti-
tude of the courts in this regard has been well expressed by the New York
Court of Appeals in Purcell v. New Fork Central R. R. 2 4 In holding that
a filed rate, which the commission had found to be unreasonable, could
not be retroactively upset, the court said:
"... The statute creating the Public Service Commission and
empowering it to supervise rates and charges was intended to cover
the whole subject of rates and supersede all common law remedies.
As long as the charges enforced are those on file with the Com-
mission, they are the only lawful charges which may be collected.
No departure from the filed rates is permitted.
"The Legislature has provided a means for the protection of
shippers against unreasonable rates. The action at law resulted in
different rates for different shippers dependent upon the opinion
of juries as to what was reasonable. The statute makes the specified
rate as fixed uniform and lawful until changed by or with the per-
mission of the Commission."
25
Basically the whole problem is, of course, one of statutory construc-
tion and therefore its solution under any present-day system depends
primarily on the applicable legislative provisions. But what principle of
statutory interpretation determines the extent to which the courts should
accord retroactive finality to a rate filed with, and theoretically or
acually approved by, a regulatory commission? Though many statutory
23 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Railroad Comm., 212 Cal. 370, 298 Pac. 991
(1931); Boston v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston, 242 Mass. 305,
136 N. B. 113 (1922); E. L. Young Heading Co. v. Payne, 127 Miss. 48, 89 So.
782 (1921); Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 225 Mo. App.
1066, 40 S. W. (2d) 524 (1931) ; Purcell v. New York Central R. R., 268 N. Y.
164, 197 N. E. 182 (1935); Woodrich v. Northern Pacific Ry., 71 F. (2d) 732
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (North Dakota statute); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Browni,
105 Okla. 133, 232 Pac. 43 (1924); Frank A. Graham Ice Co..v. Chicago, M.
& St. P. Ry., 153 Wis. 145, 140 N. W. 1097 (1913). But see Bonfils v. Public
Utilities Comm., 67 Colo. 563, 189 Pac. 775 (1920); Cullen v. Seaboard Air
Line R. R., 63 Fla. 122,58 So. 182 (1912); Barris & Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.,
102 Iowa 375, 71 N. W. 339 (1897); Central Bridge & Construction Co. v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry., 129 Neb. 726, 262 N. W. 852 (1935).
Also, under the Interstate Commerce Act, it is held that the common-law rem-
edy is superseded by the statutory remedy even though the Act purports to secure
to the patron his common-law action. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907).
24 268 N. Y. 164, 197 N. E. 182 (1935).
25 Id. at 171-172, 197 N. E. at 184. In connection with this type of state statute,
it should be noted that the Federal Power Commission, which regulates certain
interstate rates, has no authority to make reparation awards. Federal Power
Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
7
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provisions relating to the reparation problem are, to some extent at least,
in derogation of the common law in that, as the courts apply them, they
have the effect of limiting or abolishing the common-law right to re-
cover overcharges, does it follow that they should be construed strictly?
Certainly not a few courts, including the United States Supreme Court
in the Arizona Grocery case, have been guided by some other principle
or policy than the hackneyed one so often invoked in dealing with such
legislation.26 Nor have they been guided greatly by the supposedly fun-
damental theory of the common-law system that everyone who, by the
act of another, has been injured in person or property has a right to
have his grievance adjudicated ultimately by the ordinary courts, 27 for
there can be no denying that, with respect to the problem of the finality
of the filed rate in reparation cases, the once-dreaded droit administrati
has found a wide footing in the law of the land.
Since the orbit of any given rule is largely dependent on its rationale
and on the extent to which that rationale is considered sound, it will be
well, at the outset, to examine the justification for the doctrine that ad-
ministrative approval of a filed tariff is final in cases in which it is sought
to upset a rate retroactively and recover reparation with respect thereto.
The Arizona Grocery case deserves special study in this connection if
for no other reason than that it is undoubtedly the most important and
most provocative case in point that has yet been decided.
At first blush it might be thought, and indeed it has been so thought
by some, that the doctrine of that case unduly favors the public utilities
in that their knowledge of the operation of a new schedule of rates is
26 See, e.g., Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 557, 565 (1879): "No statute
is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import. It
is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it
does not fairly express." See, collecting authorities, 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1943) §§6201-6205. The clich6 that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be construed strictly, whatever its usefulness may be in
some situations, should not be applied to statutes which, like the Interstate Com-
merce Act and the state public service acts, have as their objective the setting up
of administrative machinery designed to supplant or supplement the traditional
common law touching on the same subject. Cf. id. at §§6204, 6205. Nor would
it help greatly to resort to the opposing clich6 that remedial legislation is to be
construed liberally. What is "remedial" legislation?
27 For a discussion of the protection supposed to be secured by this theory (in
England generally called the "rule of law" and in the United States commonly
called the doctrine of the "supremacy of law"), see DicEY, LAW OF THE CoNsTI-
TUTION (8th ed. 1915) 179 et seq.; Dicey, The Development of Administrative
Law in England (1915) 31 L. Q. REV. 148; DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927) 32-38; Taylor, Due Process of Law (1915)
24 YALE L. J. 353; Stone, The Common Law in the United States (1936) 50
HARV. L. REv. 4, 16 et seq.; Brandeis, J., in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United
States, 298 U. S. 38, 84 (1936); Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion: An Appraisal (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 915, 947-954; LANDIS, THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESS (1938) 123 et seq.
8
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superior to that of the patrons and therefore utilities can judge the
question of the reasonableness of a rate far better and far earlier than
can the less informed patrons. 28 Consequently, it has been contended, all
rate structures under the federal system should be flexible, and even a
commission-approved rate should not be reparation-proof. One of the
best arguments yet advanced in support of this view is a dictum of Judge
Hutcheson in the Eagle Cotton Oil Co. case,29 and inasmuch as the
reasons therein stated are the sole basis of the dissent of Mr. Justice
Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Arizona Grocery case, it seems
justifiable to quote them here in some detail:
"In my opinion neither specific approval by the Commission
of a general schedule of rates, nor the specific promulgation of a
particular rate, prevents the Commission from granting reparation
as to that rate, if, upon complaint, it is advised that reparation
should be made...
"The invoked decisions of the state courts do not support the
position of appellee here. They make strongly against it. They
show that instead of the states having a rate-making system like
the federal one, not rigid, but flexible, which permits its commis-
sions from time to time and at any time to make orders changing
rates, correcting abuses, reforming conditions, and awarding rep-
arations, while in reliance upon the power of the Commission to
retroactively repair injuries sustained as the result of their prospec-
tive orders, shippers may experimentally try out rates before re-
sorting to the courts for relief, their systems are rigid and inflex-
ible ...
"In the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Arizona Grocery Co., 49 F. (2d)
563, 568, holding that the Commission could not award reparation
as to the rates specifically theretofore prescribed by it, it is said that
under such circumstances 'the shipper's remedy would be a
seasonable application for a change of rate before any serious dam-
age had been suffered.'
"In my opinion this will not do. This is indeed the remedy,
and the only remedy, the shipper has under the state system. This
is, however, not the case under the federal system. Here the rem-
edy is simpler, more efficacious, more reasonable, more just to
shipper and carrier alike, and more consonant with the experi-
mental character of rates and rate making. This system permits
rates to be experimentally laid down and experimentally tried out.
It preserves that flexibility of adaptation, the maintenance of
28 The few comments on the Arizona Grocery case are, in general, more or less
inclined to adverse criticism. See notes (1932) 32 COL. L. Rrv. 752, (1932) 31
Micx. L. REv. 118, (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 742, (1932) 7 TULANE L. REv.
142, (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 625, (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 714; Crooks, Reparation
Actions Before Regulatory Commissions (1943) 28 IowA L. REv. 650; cf. Hale,
Commissions, Rates, and Policies (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1103, 1104-1110.
2951 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
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which is necessary to the life and growth of our great and chang-
ing commerce, which would be lost and defeated if immediate re-
sort to the courts were necessary, as in the state systems, to protect
the rights of shippers against the burdens of an experimental
rate."3 0
No one could deny the weightiness of this argument. On the other
hand, an adoption of the view therein advocated might well mean eco-
nomic ruin to many utilities and, in general, not only make the position
of the utilities more difficult than that of the patrons but also inade-
quately secure what is commonly the most important interest of both
the patrons and the utilities, namely, an assurance that the rates upon
which their business transactions are based shall be certain and not sub-
ject to retroactive readjustment if they should subsequently be found to
be unreasonable.
The Court's opinion in the Arizona Grocery case does not discuss
the position of the patrons,3 ' but the possibilities of a contrary decision
with respect to the patrons' interests are strikingly illustrated by the liti-
gation which grew out of the famous Lignite Coal case.3 2 In that con-
troversy a carrier claimed that the filed rate was confiscatory and the
United States Supreme Court upheld this contention. Thereupon the
utility sued a patron to recover the difference between the filed confis-
catory rate, which had been collected, and a reasonable rate. The state
court held that the utility was not entitled to reparation, 3 and the
United States Supreme Court, in dismissing a writ of error, quoted, ap-
parently with approval, the following excerpt from the opinion of the
state court:
"Manifestly, if shippers cannot rely upon the rates as so pub-
lished and filed, the requirement of publication becomes a mere
trap for the unwary."34
Although the rate in the Lignite Coal case was made by the legis-
lature and not by a commission, the applicable principle is clearly the
same as if it had been a commission-made rate which, as we have seen,
the Supreme Court now holds "is subject to the same tests as to its valid-
ity [in reparation cases] as would be an act of Congress [and presumably
30 Id. at 445-447.
31 The Court does, however, have this to say: "If that body [the Commission]
sets too low a rate, the carrier has no redress save a new hearing and the fixing
of a more adequate rate for the future. It cannot have reparation from the ship-
pers for a rate collected under the order upon the ground that it was unreasonably
low." 284 U. S. at 387-388.32 Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585 (1915).
33 Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 40 N.
Dak. 69, 168 N. W. 684 (1918), (1919) 32 HARv. L. Rsv. 428.34 Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 254 U. S.
370, 374 (1920).
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a state statute] intended to accomplish the same purpose."3 5 In situa-
tions in which it applies, the doctrine of the retroactive sanctity of a rate
approved by a commission or prescribed by a legislature works both
ways: it allows both patron and utility to rely upon such rate without
fear that it may be retroactively upset and made the basis of a repara-
tion award.3 6 On this point the law seems clear, both under the federal
system and under the usual state system.
Under the federal form of the doctrine, however, the question
whether a given rate is utility-made and therefore open to a possible
recovery of reparations is shrouded in considerable uncertainty, and
attempts to determine the problem have occupied no small part of the
time not only of the Commission but of the courts. Moreover, these at-
tempts have resulted in a conflict in the decisions of the lower federal
courts3 7 and also in some vacillation by the Commission. 8
Three years after the Arizona Grocery case was decided the ques-
tion of the extent to which a utility may rely on a commission-approved
rate was collaterally presented to the United States Supreme Court in
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Florida.9 In that case a state public service
commission had duly put into effect an intrastate rate. Thereafter the
Interstate Commerce Commission, in order to remove an alleged dis-
crimination against interstate commerce, prescribed a higher intrastate
rate. Later the United States Supreme Court held that this rate order
of the Commission was invalid because based on inadequate findings.4 0
Still later the Commission upon new evidence and new findings made
the same order it had made before, and the United States Supreme
Court confirmed its action.41 In a suit for restitution of the overcharges
collected by the utility while the first order of the Commission stood un-
35 Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284 U. S. 370, 388 (1932).
3c The United States Supreme Court expressly states in the Arizona Grocery
case that the utility cannot have reparation with respect to a commission-ap-
proved rate. See note 31, supra.
3' This conflict is hereinafter discussed.
3s Soon after the decision in the Arizona Grocery case the Commission refused
to award reparation where the challenged rates had been promulgated pursuant
to what the Commission considered a general adjustment order. The Commis-
sion apparently thought that such a rate was commission-approved within the
meaning of the Arizona Grocery case. Coal Trade Ass'n of Indiana v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. R., 185 I. C. C. 225 (1932). Later, however, on a reconsideration of
the case, the Commission fund that the rates were not unreasonable. 190 I. C. C.
743 (1933). More recently the Commission does not regard such rates as com-
mission-made. See, e.g., Fifteen Percent Case, 226 I. C. C. 41, 140, 141 (1938) ;
Express Rates, 231 I. C. C. 471, 500, 501 (1939). That such a rate is not com-
mission-approved, see, e.g., Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443
(C. C. A. 5th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 675 (1931).
39 295 U. S. 301 (1935).
40 Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931).
41 Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1 (1934).
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condemned, the Supreme Court held, four Justices dissenting, that resti-
tution could not be awarded.
Although the case did not squarely present the question whether
the Commission could award reparation with respect to a rate ineffec-
tually approved by the Commission, the Court nevertheless said in pass-
ing that the "Commission was without power to give reparation for the
injustice of the past."42 It would seem therefore that under the federal
system a rate invalidly prescribed by the Commission in its legislative
capacity is, or may be, commission-approved within the meaning of the
federal rule.43 At least Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the four dis-
senting Justices, evidently thought so, for he said:
"To hold that the claimants may not have restitution is to
say that invalid, void or voidable orders of the Commission have
precisely the same force and effect as orders lawfully made, if from
extrinsic facts and matters not cognizable by the court the con-
clusion may be drawn that the Commission might have made a
valid order in the circumstances. So to hold is to recognize in a res-
titution proceeding, a jurisdiction which in no other circumstances
and in no other case could a federal court exercise; and to permit
that court to ignore and nullify action in a field within the State's
sovereign power. 44
The question of the orbit of the federal rule was directly and in-
terestingly raised in Arizona Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Southern Pacific
Co.45 In that case the Commission had found that a challnged rate was
not unreasonable but had not prescribed the rate for the future, and the
precise point before the court was whether the rate was therefore com-
mission-approved within the doctrine of the Arizona Grocery case. The
court held that it was: that an administrative adjudication that a tariff
is not unreasonable amounts to a "positive finding of a negative fact," 40
and that consequently a rate so sanctioned could not be retroactively in-
validated in a claim for overcharges. The same federal court, differently
constituted, employed the same reasoning in El Paso & Southwestern R.
R. v. Phelps-Dodge Mercantile Co.47 But in Pitzer Transfer Corporation
v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,48 a different federal court arrived at a diamet-
rically opposite conclusion. 45 The United States Supreme Court has not
42295 U. S. at 312.
43 Cf. United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939).
44 295 U. S. at 329-330.
4568 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A. 9th., 1934).
46Id. at 605.
4775 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
48 10 F. Supp. 436 (D. Md. 1935).
1 Cf. Corray v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 2 F. Supp. 829 (E. D. Ill. 1933);
Standard Brick & Tile Co. v. Macon, D. & S. R. R., 86 F. (2d) 184 (C C. A.
5th, 1936).
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yet come to the rescue, although a dictum in a recent case hereinafter
considered perhaps indicates, to some extent, the general course which
the federal rule may be expected to take.50
What, then, is the orbit of the Arizona Grocery case? A doctrinaire
approach to the problem, based on the separation of powers-the ap-
proach used by the lower federal courts in the three cases just men-
tioned and by the Supreme Court in the principal case-would seem to
favor the conclusion arrived at in the Pitzer Transfer Corporation case;
for there can'be no doubt that, where a commission determines, as in a
reparation proceeding, that a filed rate is not unreasonable, it is acting
judicially, not legislatively; it is adjudicating a controversy on present or
past facts and is not promulgating a rule for the future; 51 it is acting es-
sentially as a court does in a common-law proceeding to recover an over-
charge.5 2 But does not the solution of such a far-reaching business prob-
lem as the present one call for a rationale that smacks of something more
pragmatic than an abstract separation-of-powers argument, something
more than formal "logic-chopping"? 53 Fortunately the Supreme Court
has not left us wholly without an answer; for in the opinion in the
Arizona Grocery case there appears, unstressed, one sentence which, it
is submitted, suggests both the practical justification for the decision
and the rationale which determines, or should determine, its orbit. By
way of buttressing its separation-of-powers argument, the Court said:
"As respects its future conduct the carrier is entitled to rely
upon the [Commission's] declaration as to what will be a lawful,
that is, a reasonable, rate; and if the [Commission's] order merely
sets limits it is entitled to protection if it fixes a rate which falls
within them." 4
This reason seems eminently sound. Once a commission has ap-
proved a rate as reasonable, and it is filed and put into effect, the result
would often be economically disastrous if the utility could not rely upon
50 Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U. S. 671,
685-687 (1943).
51 See Holmes, J., in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 226
(1908) : "A judicial inquiry investigation, declares and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is
its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a
rule for the future and therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind ..."
52 See Hardman, Yudicial Review as a Requirement of Due Process in Rate
Regulation (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 681, 683 et seq.
53 Cf. LANDIS, THE ADmINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) 2-5, 11 et seq., 47 et
seq.; Pound, Yustice According to Law (1914) 14 COL. L. REv. 1, 12 et seq.;
POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1942) especially at 32-34, 40-41, 51-56; DICIN-
SON, ADmINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw (1927) 16 et seq.
54 284 U. S. at 389.
13
Hardman: Administrative Finality in Claims for Overcharges
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1948
90 ADMINISTRATIVE FINALITY IN CLAIMS
the rate so long as it has not been duly set aside, or at least so long as it
has not been challenged. This line of reasoning, stated from the point
of view of the utility, has been forcefully expressed as follows by a lower
federal court:
"... Assume, for instance, a railroad whose earnings largely
depend upon one commodity. A coal-carrying road is an apt illus-
tration. The revenues of this road depend upon coal which we will
assume is 80 per cent. of its traffic. We will further assume that,
after an investigation the Interstate Commerce Commission has
fixed the rate to be charged on this coal. This rate has remained
in effect for a number of years without complaint from any ship-
per. A tremendous amount of tonnage has moved on said rate.
The revenues derived from said rate have been distributed in the
payment of dividends and interest on bonds; taxes have been paid;
betterments have been made. Can it be contended that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission has the power to later on declare that
the rate was unlawful and unreasonable and then require the car-
rier to make reparation on every single shipment which moved on
said rate? Such a condition would result in chaos. The great trans-
portation systems of this country could not exist in such circum-
stances ... If the carriers cannot use the revenues received from
the charging of a rate which the Interstate Commerce Commission
has declared to be reasonable and lawful, it is clear to this court
that it would result in chaos in the finances and credit of the car-
riers and would likewise result in breaking down the stability in
rate structures which was one of the cardinal reasons for the pass-
ing of the Interstate Commerce Act." 5' 5
As has already been indicated in part, this reasoning, mutatis mu-
tandis, applies equally to the position of the patrons. If a commission-
approved rate (or a rate approved by the legislature) could be retroac-
tively upset-if both patrons and utilities could not transact business on
an assurance that such a rate is retroactively unassailable-their respec-
tive interests in the security of transactions and acquisitions would be
inadequately protected. Without such assurance neither patrons nor
utilities could safely make the necessary plans for future business un-
dertakings, undertakings which are, in general and in the long run,
geared to the rates upon which business enterprises are largely and
often primarily dependent.
Moreover, it is frequently of the utmost importance to patrons not
only that rates shall be reasonable but also that, as between various
patrons, there shall be equality in the application of rates. It was not
always possible to insure such equality prior to the modern regulatory
55 Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 46 F. (2d) 1006, 1009 (D. Miss.
1931).
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system, for the action at law to recover an overcharge resulted in dif-
ferent rates for different patrons dependent upon the opinion of juries
as to what was reasonable.56 This equality is, however, adequately se-
cured if the filed rate is inflexibly adhered to in reparation cases. 57
While rates should, of course, be Teasonable, to the extent that an
insistence that they be so would not sacrifice more important considera-
tions, here, as elsewhere in the law, the judicial process, and, indeed, the
administrative process, too, generally involve a compromise of conflict-
ing interests.5 8 In reparation cases it is obviously impossible to secure in
full both the interest of the patrons that charges shall not be unreason-
ably high or the corresponding interest of the utilities that rates be not
unreasonably low, and also the often opposing interest of both patrons
and utilities that rates be certain. Hence, since the end of law today is to
secure the most important interests involved in a case, with a minimum
sacrifice of interests,5 9 the question for both courts and commissions in
claims for overcharges is, essentially: which of these conflicting inter-
ests is the weightier and to what extent and in what manner the para-
mount interest should be legally secured. Although the Court did not
so reason in the Arizona Grocery case and in fact, as has already been in-
dicated, did not even discuss the interests of the patrons,60 it may per-
haps be inferred from the result reached by the Court that in its estima-
tion the need that rates should be certain and that there should be equal-
ity in their application outweighs all countervailing interests in claims
for reparation, provided that the rates are commission-approved.
How, then, should a rate be treated in a claim for overcharges if the
Commission has previously found that the challenged rate was not un-
reasonable but has not specifically approved any particular rate for the
future? While it might be argued with considerable plausibility that such
56 See Crane, C. J., in Purcell v. New York Central R. R., 268 N. Y. 164, 171,
197 N. E. 182, 184 (1935).
5 See Boston v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston, 242 Mass. 305,
136 N. E. 113 (1922); T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 207 Ala.
253, 92 So. 797 (1921). To allow reparation may result in discrimination. See
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 63 Utah 392, 226 Pac. 456
(1924).
58 See CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 112-115;
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMzaON LAW (1921) 91-93, 195-203; POUND, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922) 89-99; Pound, A Survey of
Social Interests (1943) 57 HARV. L. RIv. 1, especially at 16-39.
59 See Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines
(1914) 27 HAtv. L. REv. 195; Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Yuristic
Thought (1914) 27 HARV. L. REv. 605, (1917) 30 HARv. L. REv. 201; Pound,
A Survey of Social Interests (1943) 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, especially at 16-39; cf.
Douglas, J., in Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591,
603 (1944): "The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and
reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests."
00 See note 31, supra.
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administrative approval is, within the meaning of the Arizona Grocery
case, a "declaration" of the Commission on which the public utility has
a right to rely as to the future, this argument would seem to overlook the
essential character of such an administrative finding; for, being a jitdi-
cial determination, it is, by its very nature, an approval only as to the
past. Consequently there would seem to be no sufficient reason for con-
sidering a rate so sanctioned as commission-approved within the mean-
ing of the federal rule. Moreover, the very crux of the Court's argument
in the Arizona Grocery case is that a commission-approved rate is legis-
lative in character and for that reason cannot be retroactively invali-
dated in a reparation proceeding.' It seems highly improbable there-
fore that the Supreme Court would regard such a rate as commission-
approved, 62 and it is significant that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, apparently in pursuance of a policy of construing the federal
rule narrowly, 3 has refused to follow the view that such a rate is repara-
tion-proof.6 4
The chief significance of this refusal is believed to lie largely in a
rather widespread tendency of the federal courts to limit the orbit of
the federal rule, a tendency favoring the conclusion reached in the
Pitzer Transfer Corporation case. One of the most important examples
of this trend is found in the judicial interpretation put upon general
rate orders, i.e., orders by which the Commission approves an over-all
adjustment of rates without specifically sanctioning particular rates.
Although such an order would seem to be legislative in character, since
61 In that case Roberts, J., says: "When ... the commission declares a specific
rate to be the reasonable and lawful rate for the future, it speaks as the legislature,
and its pronouncement has the force of a statute ... Where, as in this case, the
Commission has made an order having a dual aspect, it may not in a subsequent
proceeding, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, ignore its own pronouncement
promulgated in its quasi-legislative capacity and retroactively repeal its own en-
actment as to the reasonableness of the rate it has prescribed." 284 U. S. 386, 389.
62 Cf. Jackson, J., in Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Inland Waterways Corp.,
319 U. S. 671, 685-687 (1943).
63 For example, the Commission construes its "directory" action with respect to
rates as not constituting such administrative approval as will make a rate repara-
tion-proof. Schmidt Lumber Co. v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 191 I. C. C. 141,
145 (1933) ; A. B. Cole & Sons v. Missouri P. R. R., 198 I. C. C. 252, 256 (1933) ;
In re Refrigeration Charges on Fruits, Vegetables, Berries, and Melons from the
South, 222 I. C. C. 245, 268, 269 (1937) ; cf. United States v. Atlanta, B. & C. R.
R., 282 U. S. 522, 527, 528 (1931): "Its [the Commission's] functions are mani-
fold in character. In some matters its duty is merely to investigate and to report
facts ... Even in the regulation of rates, as to which the Commission possesses man-
datory power, it frequently seeks to secure the desired action without issuing a com-
mand, In such cases it customarily points out in its report what the carriers are
expected to do. Such action is directory as distinguished from mandatory." See,
also, Read Phosphate Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 194 I. C. C. 73 (1933);
note 38, supra.
64 William Kelly Milling Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 211 I. C. C. 53, 54,
55 (1935).
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [1948], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol51/iss2/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
the Commission in such a case is authorizing a rate structure for the
future and is not adjudicating a claim on present or past facts, it is held
that a rate filed pursuant to such administrative sanction is not com-
mission-approved within the meaning of the federal rule.6 5
Perhaps the most interesting illustration of this tendency with re-
spect to general adjustment orders of the Commission is found in the
Eagle Cotton Oil Co. case 66 where the Commission had authorized a
general increase in freight rates, but without approval of any particular
rate.6 7 The carriers thereupon raised the rate in question to $2.25 per
ton. Later the Commission recommended a general reduction in rates,
also without approval of any particular rate.68 The carriers then reduced
the rate in question to $2.03 per ton. The Commission subsequently
found that this rate was unreasonable and awarded reparation.9 In up-
holding this award the court said that "orders of the Commission au-
thorizing a general upward revision or adjustment of rates are not to be
construed as giving approval of or prescribing particular rates"70 and
that therefore a rate promulgated pursuant to such orders is a utility-
made rate and consequently not reparation-proof. 71
A contrary conclusion could have been reached without much dif-
ficulty; for, as Judge Hutcheson pointed out in his concurring opinion
in this case, it seems clear "that, speaking generally, the rate had received
the Commission's approval and sanction."7 2 But for the most part the
federal courts show no great love for the federal doctrine and therefore
interpret it strictly.
A somewhat similar situation exists where the Commission, in pre-
scribing a schedule of rates based on distances, has not affirmatively ap-
proved any combination rate but has merely declared in its report that
nothing has been shown which would authorize its disapproval of the
use of a combination rate. In such a situation it has been held that a
05 Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U. S. 675 (1931); Texas & P. Ry. v. Louisiana Oil Refining
Corp., 76 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), cert. denied, 295 U. S. 767 (1935) ;
City of Danville v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 34 F. Supp. 620 (W. D. Va. 1940);
Birmingham Slag Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 486 (D. C. Ala. 1935);
William Kelly Milling Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 211 I. C. C. 53 (1935);
Express Rates, 231 I. C. C. 471 (1939).06 Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
67 Ex parte 74. In the Matter of the Applications of Carriers in Official, South-
ern, and Western Classification Territories for Authority to Increase Rates, 58
I. C. C. 220 (1920).
68 Reduced Rates, 68 I. C. C. 676 (1922).
69 Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 140 I. C. C. 131 (1928).
70 51 F. (2d) at 445.
71 Cert. denied, 284 U. S. 675 (1931).
7251 F. (2d) at 445.
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tariff filed pursuant to such administrative sanction is not commission-
made within the meaning of the Arizona Grocery case. 3 Such a finding
is at most a negative sanction, not greatly unlike a determination, as in
a reparation case, that a rate is not unreasonable.7 4 Perhaps such an ad-
ministrative order may be classed as a general adjustment order. It
seems fairly clear therefore that a combination rate, so promulgated, is
not commission-approved within the meaning of the federal rule, at least
if the orbit of the rule is to be confined narrowly.7 5
Another interesting limitation upon the logical implications of the
Arizona Grocery case is possibly indicated, though only by way of dic-
tum, by the United States Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Com-
mission v. Inland Waterways Corporation,7 6 decided in 1943. In that
case, in which an injunction was sought against a rate order of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, it appeared that the Commission had
found that "The proposed schedules are shown to be just and reasonable
and are not shown to be otherwise unlawful." In disposing of a conten-
tion that by this finding the Commission had approved or prescribed a
rate structure containing certain unlawful discrepancies, the Court, per
Jackson, J., said:
"True; the Commission stated that the railroads 'are justified
under section 1 in treating the ex-barge traffic the same as local or
ex-truck traffic,' and found that 'the proposed schedules are shown
to be just and reasonable.' But this does not constitute a finding
that the rates were lawful; they 'may lie within the zone of reason-
ableness and yet result in undue prejudice' or otherwise violate
the Act. The Commission also stated that the facts of record show
that 'the proposed schedules cannot be condemned as unlawful
under sections 2 and 3 of the act.' But this statement followed im-
mediately upon the Commission's statement that from its conclu-
sion that protestants' claim as a matter of right to the existing pro-
portionals was erroneous, 'It follows that the protestants' allega-
tions cannot be sustained in this proceeding, although in a proper
proceeding we might prescribe proportional rates on the ex-barge
traffic lower than local rates or joint barge-rail rates lower than
the combinations.' Read in the context, we think it meant only that
the proposed schedules could not be struck down upon the errone-
ous view advanced by the protestants. The finding of the Commis-
73 Standard Brick & Tile Co. v. Macon, D. & S. R. R., 86 F. (2d) 184 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1936); cf. Atlantic & Y. Ry. v. Carolina Button Corp., 74 F. (2d) 870
(C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
74 This analogy was stressed by counsel in the case but the court distinguished
Arizona Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 68 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A.
9th, 1934), in which it was held that such negative sanction makes a rate corn-
mission-approved.
75 Cf. Texas & P. Ry. v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 76 F. (2d) 465 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1935).
76 319 U. S. 671 (1943).
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sion that the proposed schedules 'are not shown to be otherwise un-
lawful' is, we think, to be similarly read. This form of finding has
been held by the Commission not to constitute an approval or a
prescription of the rates under suspension.7 7 Since the Commission
refused to approve or prescribe them, they stand only as carrier-
made rates which, under the Commission's decisions, leaves them
open to possible recovery of reparations."
78
If by this argument the Court means that the sanction which the
Commission gave to the proposed schedules of rates was not sufficient
to make them commission-approved within the doctrine of the Arizona
Grocery case, this dictum would seem to indicate an inclination on the
part of the Court to limit the orbit of that case to situations in which the
Commission has determined that the rates prescribed or approved are
lawful in all respects ;79 a positive finding by the Commission, when act-
ing legislatively, that rates are just and reasonable will not suffice in a
subsequent reparation proceeding if the rates so sanctioned can be upset
on any ground other than unreasonableness; rates so approved "stand
only as carrier-made rates."3' 0 Probably, though, the Court merely meant
that a schedule of rates, so sanctioned by the Commission, is open to a
recovery of reparations only with respect to loss sustained through some
violation of the Act other than the charging of unreasonable rates.
81 If
so, the same tariff would be commission-made on the question of its un-
reasonableness and utility-made on all other questions of alleged unlaw-
fulness. In any event, the language of the Court is perhaps susceptible of
the broader interpretation, and in this connection it is interesting to note
that in support of its statement that such rates are "open to possible re-
covery of reparations" the Court cites the Arizona Grocery case. 2 Inter-
estingly, too, the opinion cites, in support of this assertion, a note in a
law review in which it is argued at some length that the rule of the
Arizona Grocery case should, if adhered to at all, be confined to the pre-
cise type of fact situation out of which the case arose.83 But whatever
77The Court cited here (in a footnote): "Standard Packing Co. v. Union
Pacific R. Co., 190 I. C. C. 433; Parkersburg Rig & Reel Co. v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co., 198 I. C. C. 709; William Kelly Milling Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 211 1. C. C. 53; Kansas City Ice Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 215
I. C. C. 616, 619; Halifax Coal & Wood Co. v. Atlantic & Y. Ry. Co., 219 I. C. C.
594; Morehead Cotton Mills Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 231 I. C. C. 437."
78 319 U. S. at 685-687.
79 But cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301 (1935).
80 319 U. S. at 687.
81 With respect to reparation for violations of the Act on other grounds than
charging unreasonable rates, see Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
297 U. S. 500 (1936).
82 319 U. S. at 687 n. 22. The Court, however, prefaces the citation of the
Arizona Grocery case with the word "Compare."
83 The note cited by the Court is (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 714. The Court
prefaces the citation with the word "Compare."
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may be the import, if any, of the Court's argument in regard to the ques-
tion whether a rate so sanctioned is reparation-proof with respect to the
question of its unreasonableness, the whole tenor of the Court's discus-
'sion seems to indicate a definite inclination to interpret narrowly admin-
istrative approvals of rate structures, to the end that appropriate repara-
tion may be recovered within wide limits. That much, at least, seems
fairly clear.
A somewhat similar inclination exists in some states with respect to
the so-called state rule. In several jurisdictions the doctrine does not ob-
tain, and in a few others the decisions disclose two significant types of
variation from the usual rule.
An early case holding that filed rates can be retroactively upset on
the ground of unreasonableness is Turner Creamery Co. v. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Raul Ry.,8 4 decided by the Supreme Court of North
Dakota in 1915. In that case the applicable statutory provisions pur-
ported, in rather general terms, to authorize the commission to make
reparation awards.85 Acting under this authority, the conmaission found
that a challenged rate was unreasonable and awarded reparation. The
court held that the commission's action was valid. The case was -ecided
before the general question was much litigated and the reasoning of the
court is extremely meager. In fact little more can be deduced from the
opinion than that, under the particular statute, a filed rate has no final-
ity in claims for overcharges.
A leading authority rejecting the usual state rule is Bonfils v. Public
Utilities Commission, decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado in
1920.86 In that case, too, the regulatory commission had statutory au-
thority to grant reparation with respect to excessive rates.8 7 In upholding
the power of the commission to make reparation awards, the court said:
"It is contended for the carriers that no claim for an over-
charge can be maintained because the charges collected were those
prescribed by the tariffs on file 'which were never at any time
changed or required to be changed, and departure from which
was expressly prohibited.' The defect in this proposition is that
the tariffs on file were illegal from the fact that they were un-
reasonable. While the carrier was prohibited from departure from
the filed charges, it was not prohibited from filing a new, reason-
able and lawful tariff.
"If, by filing an unreasonable tariff, the carrier could success-
8436 S. Dak. 310, 154 N. W. 819 (1915).
85 1 S. DAK. CoMP. LAWS (1913) p. 113, §6, p. 116, §13, p. 118, §16, p. 119,
§§17, 18, p. 120, §19.
8667 Colo. 563, 189 Pac. 775 (1920).
87 Colo. Laws 1913, c. 127, §56.
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fully assert that its collection did not result in overcharge, all rep-
aration for overcharges would be made impossible."88
Except where there is explicit legislative authority to upset a filed
rate retroactively on the ground of unreasonableness, the doctrine laid
down in these two cases finds very little support in the decisions; s 9 and
there seems to be no great likelihood that it will have any considerable
following, for the general rule, in one form or another, is now so deeply
ingrained in the usual state system that, in the absence of a statutory
change, widespread repudiation of the rule would be too much to expect
even if it were desirable. Many states, however, have enacted statutes
authorizing reparation awards with respect to filed rates which may be
found to be unreasonable,9 ° and the United States Supreme Court has
held that state legislation empowering a commission to grant reparation
with respect to a commission-approved rate does not violate the Federal
Constitution."-
But the other two types of decisions-those confining the scope of
the rule without rejecting it-present theories which may be readily ap-
plied in several states without the aid of additional legislation. One of
these types, and one which for a time seemed to hold considerable
promise, is the view that a filed rate is retroactively unassailable in a
88 67 Colo. at 576-577, 189 Pac. at 780.
89 See Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. State, 85 Okla. 223, 206 Pac. 236 (1922);
Marinette T. & W. R. R. v. Railroad Comm., 195 Wis. 462, 218 N. W. 724
(1928). But see St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. State, 155 Okla. 236, 8 P. (2d)
744 (1932); cf. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Mills Bros., 101 Ohio St. 173,
128 N. E. 81 (1920).
00 The extent to which these statutes authorize or purport to authorize repara-
tion differs considerably in different states; and in a number of instances the
authority-so far as it exists, or if it exists-must be sought in several sections of
the statute. The following legislative provisions are particularly noteworthy: ALA.
CODE (1940) tit. 48. §§124, 125: 5 ARiz. CODE ANN. (1939) §69-252; 2 CAL.
GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 6386, §71; 4 Coy.o. STATs. ANN. (1935) c.
137, §56; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§59-641, 59-642; ILL. REv. STATS. (1943)
c. 111 2/3, §76; 10 IND. STATS. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §§54-706, 54-201, 54-428,
55-123; IowA CODE 1939 §§7892, 7893, 7894, 8048, 8055 (see note 117, infra);
KAN. GEN. STATS. ANN. (1935) §§66-154a, 66-154b; Ky. REV. STATS. (Baldwin,
1942) §§276.200, 276.280, 276.330, 276.340, 276.370; NE. ComP. STATS.
(1929) §75-510; N. 0. CODE ANN. (1939) §1067; OKLA. STATS. (1941) tit. 17,
§121; 8 ORE. CoMTP. LAWS ANN. (1940) §112-453 to §112-458, inclusive; PA.
STATS. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 66, §1153; R. I. GE-\,. LAWS (1938) c. 122,
§§35,40; S. DAK. CODE (1939) §52.0303; 4 UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §76-6-20;
WASH. REV. STATS. ANN. (Remington, 1943 Supp.) §§10433, 10433-2; W. VA.
CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 3, §1, art. 4, §§6, 7 (see note 117, infra); Wis. STATS.
(1941) §195.37.
91 Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932).
But cf. Farmers Union Livestock Comm. v. Union Pacific R. R., 135 Neb. 689,
283 N. W. 498 (1939) (such legislation unconstitutional) ; St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry. v. State, 155 Okla. 236, 8 P. (2d) 744 (1932) (such legislation un-
constitutional) ; State ex rel. Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Public Service Comm., 303
Mo. 212, 259 S. W. 445 (1924) (commission cannot be given power to award
reparation).
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claim for overcharges until challenged but that reparation may be had
from the date of the filing of a complaint. Under this view a flexibility of
rate structure is maintained within reasonable limits and at the same
time the interest of both patrons and utilities that rates be certain are,
until the date of challenge, adequately secured. In promulgating this
variation of the usual state rule, the Supreme Court of Washington said:
"... when a rate is filed, published and permitted to become
effective by the department, it is and remains, until challenged in
the manner provided by statue, the lawful rate, and the only lawful
rate, to be charged and collected. Otherwise, the carrier would
never know what its lawful earnings were, and could never allo-
cate its earnings to betterments and dividends without the pos-
sibility of being embarrassed by delayed orders to make restitution
... Therefore, when a scheduled rate is challenged, that challenge
should affect the scheduled rate only from the date of the filing of
the complaint." 92
In applying this doctrine in a later case, the same court justified its
rule as follows:
"The appellant argues that to deny recovery as against an
allegedly unreasonable rate prior to the date of filing a complaint
with the department, is in effect the denial of a common law right
and leaves a wrong without a remedy. But our statute requires
that all rates be reasonable and, to insure this, prescribes that they
be filed and published with the regulatory authority for a named
period before their effective date, so that everyone concerned may
have notice with an opportunity to challenge them; and the de-
partment of public works may, upon its own motion, suspend them
pending investigation. They are also subject to challenge after
their effective date by anyone affected. So long as they remain ef-
fective and unchallenged, they are presumed to be reasonable." '
Recently, however, the legislature of the state of Washington, the
principal home of this theory, wrote into its statutes some of the most
sweeping and emphatic reparation provisions to be found in any state' 4
These provisions not only make it mandatory upon the commission to
award reparation with respect to any rate found by the commission to
be unreasonable but specifically require that damages be awarded
whether the excessive rate was charged and collected before or after the
filing of a complaint. Furthermore, the statute, after laying down in
some detail the procedure to be followed by the courts in dealing with
reparation cases, declares that "neither the Supreme Court nor any
92 Puget Sound Navigation Co. v. Department of Public Works, 157 Wash. 557,
561-562, 289 Pac. 1006, 1008 (1930).
93 State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Public Works, 185 Wash.
235, 238, 53 P. (2d) 318, 319 (1936). Accord.: State ex rel. Model Water & Light
Co. v. Department of Public Service, 199 Wash. 24, 90 P. (2d) 243 (1939).
94 WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1943 Supp.) §§10433, 10433-2.
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Superior Court shall have jurisdiction save in the manner hereinbefore
provided."
This statutory change, which may perhaps be regarded as a legis-
lative indictment of the court for supposed failure to interpret a repara-
tion provision so as to secure flexible rate structures,95 does not stand
alone in this regard. 8 Moreover, these statutory changes-if not legisla-
tive warnings-may have special significance in connection with the
second type of variation from the usual rule, for in this second form of
variation it is, in general, the legislatures rather than the courts that
seem to have evinced dissatisfaction with rigid rate structures and have
sought to inject flexibility.
This latter type of variation from the so-called state rule, and the
most important one, is essentially the same as the doctrine laid down by
the majority of the Court in the Arizona Grocery case. According to this
view the administrative approval inherent in permitting a filed rate to
become effective is not enough to make it reparation-proof; perfunctory
sanction will not suffice; the rate must be "commission-made" or, at
least, there must be formal approval.
One of the most interesting cases expressing this view is Western
Ry. of Alabama v. Montgomery County,97 decided by the Supreme
Court of Alabama in 1934 and hereinbefore mentioned in another con-
nection. In Alabama, it will be recalled, the court originally enunciated
the usual state doctrine.9 8 But in the Western Ry. of Alabama case, the
court, apparently conforming its rule to the federal doctrine, held that
a filed rate is not reparation-proof when it is utility-made and implied
that no reparation may be had with respect to commission-approved
rates.9 9 The second case was, however, decided under a statute differ-
05 Cf. Winslow, A Legislative Indictment of the Courts (1916) 29 HARv. L.
R v. 395.98 See particularly ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 48, §§124, 125 [cf. T. R. Miller Mill
Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 207 Ala. 253, 92 So. 797 (1921)]; ILL. REv. STATS.
(1943) c. 111 2/3, §76 [cf. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. People, 77 Ill. 443 (1875)];
KAN. GEN. STATS. ANN. (1935) §§66-154a, 66-154b [cf. Great Western Portland
Cement Co. v. Public Service Comm. 121 Kan. 531, 247 Pac. 881 (1926)]; 4
UTAH CoDE ANN. (1943) §76-6-20 [cf. Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry. v. Public Utili-
ties Comm., 64 Utah 54, 227 Pac. 1025 (1924).07 228 Ala. 426, 153 So. 622 (1934).
08 T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Louisville" & N. R. R., 207 Ala. 253, 92 So. 797
(1921).
09 Although the second Alabama case did not decide that commission-ap-
proved rates are reparation-proof, the court, in holding the utility-made rate to
be subject to a reparation award, distinguished the Arizona Grocery case in a
way which would seem to indicate that the court would probably follow the
federal rule with respect to commission-approved rates. The court seemed to
adopt the doctrine laid down in Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry., 51 F.
(2d) 443 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931), in which, as the Alabama court put it, "repara-
tion was awarded upon the theory the rate enforced was a carrier-made rate as
distinguished from one fixed by law."
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ing appreciably from the one under which the first case was decided.
The later statute, like the Interstate Commerce Act, authorized repara-
tion awards in terms seemingly broad enough to sanction retroactive
redress even with respect to commission-made rates,100 whereas the ear-
lier statute not only was rather indefinite as to any right to recover over-
charges but was pretty specific as to the legality of filed rates. 0 1 The
doctrine of the second Alabama decision must therefore be regarded
largely as a legislative rather than a judicial modification of the general
rule.
The leading case propounding this variation of the usual rule is
State ex rel. Boynton v. Public Service Commission,'0 2 decided by the
Supreme Court of Kansas in 1932. There the applicable legislation in
general terms empowered the commission to make reparation awards. 08
In interpreting the statute the court said:
".... it seems clear that when a rate has been the subject of a
deliberate inquiry in which the carriers, the shippers and the com-
mission's own experts have participated, as well as any and all
other persons who cared to take a hand in it as the statute provides
and permits (R.S. 66-111, 66-112, 66-113), any rate so prescribed
by the commission and put into effect by the carriers may be con-
fidently collected and retained by them as their very own, without
misgiving that at some future time a further hearing of the com-
mission may be had and more evidence taken and a different con-
clusion reached, and those rates condemned as unreasonable, and
reparation certificates allowed for the difference between the rates
which the commission did authorize and the rates which it should
have authorized ... Nor would it be worth the while of any ship-
per to receive such a reparation certificate, for it would not serve
as a justifiable basis of recovery. That point, at least, was laid at
rest by the recent decision of the supreme court of the United
States in Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 284
U. S. 370...
"Yet another question is submitted for our solution. It relates
to the shippers' right to a reparation certificate in cases where the
rates exacted were filed with the commission and perfunctorily
approved by it without hearing and determination of their reason-
ableness, but which rates are afterwards found to have been un-
just, unreasonable or otherwise unfair and discriminatory against
100 See 4 ALA. CODE (1923) §§9722, 9723, 9703.
101 See ALA. CODE (1907) §§5553, 5554, 5525, 5527, 5669, 5678.
102 135 Kan. 491, 11 P. (2d) 999 (1932).
103 The statute provides: ". . . upon complaint in writing made to the public
service commission that an unfair, unjust, unreasonable . . . rate or charge has
been exacted, such commission shall investigate said complaint, and if sustained,
shall make a certificate under its seal setting forth what is, and what would
have been, a reasonable and just rate or charge for the service rendered, which
shall be prima facie evidence of the matter therein stated." KAN. GEN. STATS.
ANN. (1935) §66-154a.
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the shipper. Under the interstate commerce act, as administered
by the federal commission, reparation is permitted in such
cases .
"The point is made on behalf of the carriers that rate sched-
ules filed with a state commission are on a different footing from
those filed with the federal commission in this respect: A schedule
of interstate freight rates filed with the interstate commerce com-
mission goes into effect in thirty days unless that commission
makes an order suspending them, whereas no schedule of intra-
state rates filed with the usual state commission goes into effect
unless and until the state tribunal makes an order authorizing
them. A majority of this court holds that this procedure is one of
form merely, not of substance. The public service commission is
not equipped to make a critical analysis of an entire schedule of
rates, and its approval is necessarily pro forma, and the rates thus
approved will merely stand as legal for the carriers to exact until
it develops in actual practice that particular instances reveal them
to be oppressive or otherwise unreasonable."' 10 4
An interesting case adopting this view is Cheltenham & Abington
Sewerage Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, decided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1942.105 The case is particularly
interesting for the reason that in an earlier decision the same court, in
allowing reparation with respect to a filed Tate, had used language suf-
ficiently comprehensive to include all filed rates. 0 6 Moreover, the lan-
guage of the statute is apparently broad enough to warrant a construc-
tion which would permit a reparation award even with respect to rates
specifically prescribed by the commission.10 7 The court, however,
adopted the distinction drawn by the United States Supreme Court in
the 'Arizona Grocery case, and held that "commission-made" rates are
reparation-proof up to the time when the commission determines, if it
determines, that the challenged rates are retroactively unreasonable.
Until such determination, the utility has a right to rely on them. 08
It should be noted therefore that in adopting this view the Pennsyl-
vania court was not enlarging the field of reparation awards; it was
really doing what the United States Supreme Court did in the Arizona
Grocery case and what the Supreme Court of Kansas did in the case just
mentioned: it was limiting the field. In fact the case purports to follow
104 135 Kan. at 504, 506, 11 P. (2d) at 1006-1007.
105 344 Pa. 366, 25 A. (2d) 334 (1942).
106 Allegheny Steel Co. v. New York Central R. R., 324 Pa. 353, 188 At.
332 (1936).
107 See Pa. Laws 1913, p. 1405, §5.
10s But see Cheltenham & Abington Sewerage Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Util-
ity Comm., 355 Pa. 377, 49 A. (2d) 707 (1947). In this case the Pennsylvania
supreme court upheld an award of reparation by the commission, but it is not
clear from the court's opinion whether the court actually retreated from the
position which it took in 1942.
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the Arizona Grocery case. Consequently these two cases, and perhaps
the Alabama case, are setbacks for the proponents of flexible rate struc-
tures.
Similarly the Supreme Court of Nebraska has recently construed
the seemingly all-comprehensive provisions of its reparation statute 00
so as to preclude a retroactive upsetting of a filed rate which has been
commission-approved within the meaning of the Arizona Grocery case,
relying upon and expressly following the federal form of the rule. 10 It
is to be observed that here, too, the court is creating, not limiting, a field
of administrative finality with respect to the recovery of reparations on
the ground that a filed rate is unreasonable.
The same result as that reached by the Nebraska court was reached
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in St. Louis-&an Francisco Ry. v.
State."' In a prior decision the Oklahoma court had allowed reparation
with respect to a utility-made rate."12 But in the later case the court dis-
tinguished its earlier decision and held that there could be no repara-
tion where the challenged rate had been prescribed by the commis-
sion.1 3 It is perhaps not without significance that, although the court
did not cite the Arizona Grocery case, which had been decided only two
months before, the court injected into its decision the philosophy under-
lying the federal rule, namely, that rate structures should-Be stable where
the commission has specifically prescribed them: that flexibility, with all
its advantages, is purchasable at too high a price when interested parties
are not allowed to rely on commission-approved rates until such rates
are duly set aside. It is also pertinent to note that here, once again, the
court is creating a field of administrative finality, not confining one.
A significant feature of these decisions, except the Oklahoma de-
cision, is that in professing to follow the federal doctrine they recognize
the fundamental sameness of a reparation problem under the federal sys-
tem and under any state system in which the applicable statutory provi-
sions are not essentially unlike the corresponding provisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Act." 4 This form of variation from the usual rule could
109 NEB. ComP. STATS. (1929) §75-510.
11o Farmers Union Livestock Comm. v. Union Pacific R. R., 135 Neb. 689,
283 N. W. 498 (1939). Apparently the court would allow reparation as to rates
which are not commission-made, although the court does not decide the question.
Cf. Central Bridge & Construction Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 129 Neb. 726,
262 N. W. 852 (1935).
111 155 Okla. 236, 8 P. (2d) 744 (1932).
112 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. State, 85 Okla. 223, 206 Pac. 236 (1922).
113 It should be observed, however, that the court based its second decision on
the ground that the state constitution forbids the commission to change its rate
orders retroactively.
114 In the Boynton case the court says: "Moreover, it is not possible to dis-
tinguish in principle a case where the interstate rate exacted is promulgated aftcr
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easily find acceptance in other state systems, for several state courts have
not yet fully committed themselves with respect to the general problem
and in some jurisdictions the applicable statutory provisions are suscep-
tible of an interpretation similar to that enunciated in these cases." 5
Under this view, as under the federal doctrine, rates may be "ex-
perimentally laid down and experimentally tried out," except where the
regulatory commission has specifically approved them. Also, under this
form of the rule, as under the federal rule, a large percentage of filed
rates would remain utility-made and therefore not reparation-proof. 116
Within rather wide limits, therefore, this view preserves the advantages
of flexible rates. But beyond those limits it recognizes the paramount
interests to be secured by stable rate structures.
Although the rationale of the Boynton case, namely, that the utili-
ties (and presumably the patrons) have a right to rely on a rate which
has been deliberately approved by a commission, is preferable to the sep-
aration-of-powers argument of the Arizona Grocery case, it is not alto-
gether easy to see why, as a practical matter, the same reason does not
apply to a tariff which the commission has approved for the future but
only pro forma. If the interests of utilities and patrons that rates shall be
certain are best secured by regarding as reparation-proof a rate which
has been deliberately approved, why does not an adequate securing of
these same interests require that a rate approved pro forma be similarly,
treated? No one could question many of the obvious advantages of a
flexible rate structure. But they can be purchased only at a very high
price: often costly litigation, and the uncertainty and possible inequality
inherent in the enforcement of flexible tariffs. For example, a query im-
mediately presents itself under this variation of the usual state rule as
to what constitutes a "deliberate" as distinguished from a "pro forma"
approval? Would a filed rate which a commission has authorized by
specific order, pursuant to an agreement of interested parties but with-
out a hearing, be reparation-proof? Or would specific administrative
sanction given after an inadequate hearing suffice?1 7 Perhaps this is a
a hearing by the federal commission and a case where the intrastate rate is sim-
ilarly ordered into effect after a hearing by the state commission." 135 Kan. at
505. Cf. Bickley, C. J., in Kemp Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 36 N. M.
126, 135, 9 P. (2d) 387, 392 (1932) : "Since the appellant claims there is a dif-
ference between the federal system and that prevailing in Alabama, Mississippi
and Virginia i.e., in the usual state system, we must observe that upon reason and
precedent the distinction is too shadowy to be relied upon." However, the judge
adopted the usual state rule.
17. See note 90, supra; note 118 infra.
116 See Roberts, J., in Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 284
U. S. 370, 390 (1932).
"17 Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301 (1935).
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field in which the rights of the parties should not depend on uncertain-
ties. Perhaps, on the whole, the paramount interests of both patrons and
utilities would be best secured by a system of stable tariffs.
At any rate, to date, most courts have not seriously questioned the
so-called state rule. Even where the public service act could arguably
be construed as authorizing a reparation proceeding, it seems to be
widely assumed, when not decided, that there can be no retroactive re-
lief with respect to a filed tariff which has been administratively allowed
to become effective: that the patron's only remedy, in case the rate is
excessive, is to seek the establishment of a new and reasonable rate.""
This conclusion is buttressed by a recent important case decided by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in 1946.119 In that case the part of the ap-
plicable state statute which was relied upon provided, inter alia, that
"The Michigan public service commission is hereby vested with com-
plete power and jurisdiction to regulate all public utilities in the state
except any municipally owned utility and except as otherwise restricted
by law."'120 There was, it seems, no statutory restriction as to making
reparation awards. The Michigan public service commission construed
this statute as authorizing it to award reparation with respect to a filed
commission-approved rate which was found to have been unreasonable.
But the Supreme Court of Michigan, adhering to the so-called state rule,
held that the retroactive relief awarded was unauthorized, saying,
among other things, that "all statutes are prospective in their opera-
tion excepting in such cases as the contrary clearly appears from the con-
text of the statute itself."
118 In Iowa, for example, the public utilities act is perhaps susceptible of an
interpretation which would permit a more or less flexible rate structure. IOWA
CODE (1939) §§7892, 7893, 7894, 8048, 8055. However, the Iowa court does not
seem to have committed itself very far on the general question. Cf. Barris & Co.
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 102 Iowa 375, 71 N. W. 339 (1897). For a discussion of
the Problem in Iowa, see Crooks, Reparation Aclions Before Regulatory Com-
missions (1943) 28 IowA L. REv. 650. So, too, in West Virginia the applicable
statutory provisions are seemingly susceptible of a construction which would
authorize reparation on the theory advanced in the Boynton case or, arguably, on
other theories. W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 3, §1, art. 4, §§6, 7. The West
Virginia court, however, apparently takes the position that these provisions are
applicable only to charges made in excess of the "legal" rate as distinguished from
"reasonable" rate. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 90 W. Va. 74,
110 S. E. 489 (1922); Natural Gas Co. of W. Va. v. Sommerville, 113 W. Va.
100, 166 S. E. 852 (1932); Wilson v. Brennan, 114 W. Va. 777, 174 S. E. 696
(1934); Charleston Apartments Corp. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 118
W. Va. 694, 192 S. E. 294 (1937). See Hardman, The Finality of the Filed Rate
in West Virginia (1943) 49 W. VA. L. Q. 143. It remains to be seen whether
the courts in such jurisdictions will deviate greatly, if at all, from the so-called
state rule.
119 Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 315
Mich. 533, 24 N. W. (2d) 200 (1946).
120 Mich. Acts 1939, No. 3, §6, Stat. Ann. 1945 Supp. §22.13(6).
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The pertinent West Virginia statute, the applicable provisions of
which are set out in the accompanying footnote,1 21 is much more specific
and far more favorable than the Michigan statute with respect to the
possibility of retroactive relief. Yet the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has apparently adopted the usual state rule, at least as to
filed rates which have been specifically approved by the commission.
The West Virginia cases in point have been discussed at considerable
length by the present writer in a prior issue of the Law Quarterly. 122
Whether the West Virginia court would apply the so-called state rule to
a filed rate which has not been "specifically" approved remains to be
seen.
To sum up, it seems fairly clear that, notwithstanding a tendency to
confine the scope of the doctrine of the finality of "commission-ap-
proved" rates in reparation cases, the core of the rule remains firmly en-
trenched both under the federal system and, with a few variations and
several statutory rejections or modifications, under the state system.
Under the federal form of the doctrine a filed rate, if commission-ap-
proved, is inviolate in claims for overcharges; and this proposition,
though differently interpreted, is equally true under most state systems
where, in general, the routine administrative approval inherent in put-
ting a tariff into effect is regarded as sufficient to make it reparation-
proof. If the administrative approval is erroneous, the mistake cannot
be retroactively corrected either under the federal form of the rule or
under the form or forms adopted in a majority of the states; the statu-
tory requirement that rates shall be reasonable is not even a subject of
121 "All charges, tolls and rates shall be just and reasonable," W. VA. REv.
CODE (1931 ) c. 24, art. 3, § 1 ; "Any person, firm, association of persons, corpora-
tion, municipality or county, complaining of anything done or omitted to be done
by any public utility subject to this chapter, in contravention of the provisions
thereof, or any duty owing by it under the provisions of this chapter, may present
to the commission a petition which shall succinctly state all the facts. Whereupon,
if there shall appear to be any reasonable ground to investigate such complaint,
a statement of the charges thus made shall be forwarded by the commission to
such public utility, which shall be called upon to satisfy such complaint or to
answer to the same in writing within a reasonable time to be specified by the
commission. If such public utility within the time specified shall make reparation
for the injury alleged to have been done, or correct the practice complained of
and obey the law and discharge its duties in the premises, then it shall be relieved
of liability to the complainant for the particular violation of the law or duty com-
plained of. If such public utility shall not satisfy the complainant within the time
specified, it shall be the duty of the commission to investigate the same in such
manner and by such means as it shall deem proper." Id. at art. 4, §6; "Any person,
firm, or corporation claiming to be damaged by any violation of this chapter by
any public utility subject to the provisions of this chapter, may make complaint
to the commission, as provided herein, and bring suit in his own behalf for the
recovery of the damages for which such public utility may be liable under this
chapter in any circuit court having jurisdiction." Id. at art. 4, §7.
122 See Hardman, The Finality of the Filed Rate in West Virginia (1943) 49
W. VA. L. 2. 143.
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judicial inquiry; the commission-approved rate is the yardstick of its
own legality. Flexibility, a generally accepted attribute of administrative
law, has yielded here to considerations of certainty and, apparently, to a
neolegal insistence that the doctrine of the supremacy of law, long
thought of as all-inclusive, has only a limited application to matters en-
trusted to administrative control.
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